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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DONALD W. YORK,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case Number: 920378 CA
vs.

KENNETH V. SHULSEN, Warden,
Utah State Prison and DAVID L.
WILKINSON, Attorney General,
State of Utah,

Priority Number 3

Respondents/Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The issue of this Habeas Corpus proceeding, both at the Lower Court and on appeal,
is not the guilt or innocence of the Petitioner, but rather his competence to enter a plea of
guilty to an offense that he had no memory of committing. With this issue in mind, the
Petitioner disagrees with the Statement of Facts as the same are set forth in the
Respondent's brief.
As an example, the Respondent begins its statement of facts with a foot note that
reads:
Because petitioner pled guilty and was thus not subject to a trial on the
merits, the facts are gleaned from various sources in the record and presented
in the light most favorable to the habeas court's ruling. See Bundy v. Deland
739 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988).
The Respondent apparently interprets this to mean that since there was no trial record it
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is free to pick and choose facts as well as misquote statements, use sources not admitted or
used in any of the Lower Court proceedings, both at the trial level and during the Habeas
hearing, add or distort information; and then present it as fact. This is all done, according
to the Respondent, to present a record Hin the light most favorable to the habeas court's
ruling."
As a further example, Moreover, the first three paragraphs of the Respondant's
Statements of Facts are taken from the deposition of Dr. Alma Carlisle and refer specifically
to his account of his memory of statements made to him while the Petitioner was under
hypnosis. This deposition was never referred to or entered as an exhibit in the Habeas
hearing and as such was not part of the record before the Writ Court nor is this deposition
part of the record on appeal.
While some assertions and allegations set forth in Respondent's statement of facts
may be appropriate to an appeal after a trial on the merits of this case, the majority of the
stated facts are simply irrelevant to this proceeding. This Court is therefore referred to the
Appellant's Brief for a more consistent and better supported statement of the relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT
The both the record before the Trial Court and manifest indications of the Petitioner
to the Trial Court were sufficient for the Trial Court to order further evaluations of, and a
competency hearing for, the Petitioner. The Trial Court erred by not entering such an
order.
The record before the Writ Court together with the evidence produced and testimony
adduced through the witnesses and Petitioner were sufficient for the Writ Court to grant the
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Writ Court erred by not granting the Petitioner's
2

application.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE A
FINDING OF COMPETENCY.
The Trial Court having received the Petitioner's notice of intent to rely on the
defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, ordered an examination of the Petitioner
by Heber C. Kimball, Ph.D. and Chris Ghicadus, M.D., to determine emotional/mental state
of mind of Petitioner at time crime was committed.
The Respondent, in its asserts:
"...[T]he trial court ordered the mental examinations solely to determine
petitioner's sanity, as required by section 77-14-4"
The Respondent continues with:

"Contrary to petitioner's assertions, both doctors

conclusively determined petitioner was not mentally ill." (Respondent's Brief P 18)
Apparently the Respondent does not understand what "mental illness", "mental
health", "competency", "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity" are.
Section 76-2-305(4) UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) (as amended) reads:
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may
be a congenital condition or one the result of injury or a residual effect of a
physical or mental disease." Emphasis added.
Both of the appointed examiners found the closest diagnoses they could reach to
describe the "dysfunction" of the Petitioner, which they diagnose as Borderline Personality
Disorder, which they described as resulting in:
"[HJaving difficulties in marriage, difficulties in employment, problems
with employers, instability in living situations, sometimes making irrational
decisions, being labile in mood from depressive to expansive moods, and
perhaps tolerating or living deviant lifestyles." (Habeas Exhibit No. 2).
3

Emphasis added.
Suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder certainly cannot make an individual
free from "mental illness" or provide "mental health". In fact, the point that persons
suffering from this disorder are prone to "sometimes making irrational decisions" should be
another indication of possible problems with the Petitioner's competency.
The Petitioner fully agrees that the alienists were directed to determine the mental
and emotional condition of the Petitioner at the time the crime was committed. However,
an examination of the evaluations indicates that neither examiner was able or willing to state
what the emotional or mental state of mind of the Petitioner was during or at the time of
the crime. However, they both state that additional testing and evaluations were needed.
...[S]ince he states that he has a hiatus or a memory loss or amnesia for the
events from leaving California up to the time he walked into the police
station, makes it virtually impossible to assess in retrospect his intention or
state of mind at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.
The diagnostic dilemma also leads one into another area of this
person's dysfunction and that is the possibility, where albeit minimal, is that
of some organic pathology. The history indicates some time in the 70's of
some head and neck injuries...one would have to reckon with the possibility
of a person having some kind of rare "seizure-like" activity in the brain that
might render them incapacitated for periods of time and the only way this
would be resolved would be with a totally complete neurologic examination
that might include computerized tomographic brain scans,
electroencephalograms.
The diagnostic category seems to give me the most trouble... Currently,
the diagnosis that encompasses this very descriptive disorder is borderline
personality1... They usually may be buffeted and traumatized somewhere in
\ Borderline Personality Disorder may coexist with Multiple Personality Disorder. However, often the
person with Multiple Personality Disorder is incorrectly diagnosed as having only Borderline Personality
Disorder because the alternation of the personalities is mistakenly thought to be the instability of mood, selfimage, and interpersonal behavior that characterizes Borderline Personality Disorder. Similarly, other mental
disorders may coexist with or obscure the presence of Multiple Personality Disorder. Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition - Revised) (herein after "DSM-III-R") American Psychiatric
Association 1987. Emphasis added.
4

childhood and end up never really satisfactorily dealing with life. That is,
having difficulties in marriage, difficulties in employment, problems with
employers, instability in living situations, sometimes making irrational
decisions, being labile in mood from depressive to expansive moods, and
perhaps tolerating or living deviant lifestyles. (Habeas Exhibit No. 2)
However, he continues to complain of sometimes blackouts, inability
to recall certain episodes during periods of trauma as well as during the socalled normal functioning periods. He claims that he was hyperactive as a
child and that at one time he was on phenobarbital, which is a drug often used
for epileptic seizure control. ...there is evidence in the records for learning
disability, possible dyslexia, a couple of accidents where there was some brain
injury supposedly. It is my opinion that further examination is in order,
including brain scan and electroencephalograph to rule out any possible aftereffects.
Diagnostically, he fits the borderline personality disorder closer than
anything else.
There is a possibility he was suffering from intermittent amnesic
episodes because of the trauma of the incident, similar to the trauma that a
15 year old girl would have memory-wise if she had been raped. Once again,
there is no medical history or evidence of any fugue or dissociative states
which would have reduced his capacity to control his impulses at the time of
the alleged crime. (Habeas Exhibit No. 3)
Both appointed examiners found problems with the Petitioner's emotional condition,
lapses of memory2 or dissociative states, history of both physical as well as emotional
problems which, in fact, were symptomatic of the mental condition, Multiple Personality
Disorder3, (hereinafter referred to as "MPD") which was subsequently discovered later when
2

. Amnesia may be relevant as a symptom indicating a present defect or abnormality in a defendant's
reasoning ability. See State v Swanson, 626 P.2d 527, (Wash. App. 19 ) at 528.
3

. From the DSM-III-R (p 271) we learn the characteristics of MPD:

Age at onset. Onset of Multiple Personality Disorder is almost invariably in childhood, but most cases
do not come to clinical attention until much later.
Course. The disorder tends to be chronic, although over time the frequency of switching between the
personalities often decreases.
Impairment. The degree of impairment varies from mild to severe, depending primarily on the nature
of, and relationships among, the personalities and only secondarily on their number.
5

Dr. Carlisle attempted to assist the Petitioner in assessing his mental condition and to
discover why he had no memory of the crime.
Dr. Jeppsen comments in his evaluation:
Mr. York's childhood history, lifestyle and symptomatology are
characteristic of that of Multiple personality disorder. Multiple personality
disorder is not an easy diagnosis to make unless it is suspected. Both Drs.
Ghicadus and Kimball were uncertain of the diagnosis and diagnosed
borderline personality disorder. Borderline personality disorder is not
incompatible with multiple personality disorder. As a matter of fact, most
multiple personality disordered people fit the criteria for borderline
personality and vice versa; there is frequently an overlap between these two.
In my opinion, Mr. York suffered from a multiple personality disorder
secondary to his longstanding abusive childhood and that he was confused by
memory lapses which resulted from his multiple personality disorder. (Habeas
Exhibit No. 1)
Dr. Carlisle at the Petitioner's Habeas hearing testified that:
"We had revived the memory. We had worked with the personality
who referred to himself as Dan Hell. I believed that there were others."
(Habeas P 47 L 20 - 22)
The Respondent has made the same error that both the Trial Court and the Writ
Court have made. When the appointed examiners stated they required additional testing
to provide the Trial Court with the answer to the question "was there a possibility he was
suffering from a mental illness or that he had diminished mental capacity at the time the
crime was committed" the Trial Court should have provided a means for the additional
testing to answer the question it had asked. Since the Petitioner was unable to pay for this
additional testing the Trial Court should have ordered those tests and evaluations at State
expense.

Predisposing factors. Several studies indicate that in nearly all cases, the disorder has been preceded
by abuse (often sexual) or another form of severe emotional trauma in childhood.
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A. Well, I was — I went to see the doctors, and the lawyer was to get
me some doctors, but I ran out of money, and I couldn't get an insanity plea.
I didn't have any money to pay for the doctors at the time. (Habeas P 8 L 1317)
Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981) at 515 teaches that:
Due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing, sua sponte, on a
defendant's competence to plead guilty whenever the trial judge entertains or
reasonably should entertain a good faith doubt as to the defendant's ability to
understand the nature and consequences of the plea, or to participate
intelligently in the proceedings and to make a reasoned choice among the
alternatives presented. Citing Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir.
1977). On review, our inquiry is not whether the trial court could have found
the defendant either competent or incompetent, nor whether we would find
the defendant incompetent if we were deciding the matter de novo. We
review the record to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that a
reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting
the defendant's competence. Citing Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 621
(9th Cir), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 849, (1977)).
The Chaves Court continues with:
If all the evidence should raise a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's competence, a hearing is required for due process reasons. This
is true even if the psychiatrist's report 'indicates' sanity or competence and
thus would not require a hearing under the statute. Id. at 517. Emphasis
added.
Here, instead of the Trial Court taking action to enable the examiners to provide the
information requested, the Trial Court, and the Respondent look at statements concerning
the examiners opinions as to the ability of the Petitioner at the time of testing. Even this
is flawed because the Petitioner did not possess a knowledge of the crime, as all reports
indicated. This alone would hinder his assisting his attorney in preparing his defence. The
Petitioner testifies in the Habeas hearing:
tf

...[T]hey had an insanity plea that Judge Page accepted, because I
couldn't relate to my lawyers enough for them to do anything. They were kind
of scared of me, I guess, at the time. They didn't know how to handle me."
(Habeas P 7)
7

The State is correct, competency was not the question asked by the Court when
ordering the evaluation of the Petitioner. Instead, the Trial Court asked, "was the Petitioner
suffering from insanity or diminished mental capacity at time crime was committed?" This
question was never answered by either of the appointed alienists.
The subsequent teachings of Bailey {State v. Bailey, 111 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985))
notwithstanding, before taking any other action in this case it was the responsibility of the
Trial Court to either obtain the answer for the question it had asked, or, with the Petitioner's
withdrawal of his notice of intent to offer the defense of insanity or diminished mental
capacity, to determine if the Petitioner was competent to withdraw his notice.
As with the waiver of all rights, waiver of an NGI [Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity] plea must satisfy certain conditions to be constitutionally
valid. In particular, the defendant must be capable of making and must
actually make an intelligent and voluntary decision. (Citation omitted). This
requires the trial judge to "conduct inquiry designed to assure that the
defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends
consequences of failing to assert the [insanity] defense, and freely chooses to
raise or waive the defense. State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983),
citing Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C. 1979) and State v.
Khan, N.J. Super 72, 82, 417 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1980).
... [T]he only permissible inquiries when a defendant seeks to waive his
insanity defense are whether he is competent to stand trial and whether his
decision is intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 1222. Emphasis added.
There is no record of the withdrawal of the Petitioner's Notice to offer the defense
of insanity or diminished mental capacity, let alone a hearing to determine what knowledge
and understanding the Petitioner had concerning such withdrawal. Nor is there any record
of any attempt to determine if Petitioner was competent to stand trail.
Despite the Respondent's attempt to inform us of the reason the Petitioner entered
his guilty plea. The fact is, the Court appointed examiner's findings and reports were totally
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inconclusive as to the condition of the Petitioner at the time of the crime. The Petitioner's
testimony at the Habeas Hearing indicated he didn't have money to hire doctors or for
testing. He also states:
"All I remember is that they were supposed to have a hearing, a
competency hearing, and they never did, because I couldn't afford the
doctors." {Habeas P 8 L 23-25, P 9 L 1)
The Petitioner maintains that the Trial Court erred by accepting the Petitioner's guilty
pleas without first determining that the Petitioner was competent to waive his insanity or
diminished mental capacity defense, or determining that the Petitioner's decision was
intelligent and voluntary. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644 (1976) that:
...[S]uch a plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it was voluntary in
a constitutional sense. (Footnote omitted). And clearly the plea could not be
voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he
committed the offense unless the defendant received "real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process." (Citation omitted).
The Respondent continues to labor under the erroneous idea that the issufe is
whether or not the Petitioner requested a competency hearing and that the only time the
court is required to hold a competency hearing is if the defendant or prosecutor requests
one. However, § 77-15-4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) (as amended) provides:
The court in which a charge is pending may direct the prosecuting attorney to
file a petition pursuant to Section 77-15-3(1).
Accordingly, the Trial Court also has a responsibility to assure that the defendant is
competent to proceed with what ever process is before the court. The responsibility of the
Trial Court is expressed in People v. Thomas, 616 N.E.2d 695 (111. App. 1993) where we learn
at page 696 that:
9

Once facts are brought to attention of trial court which raise a bona
fide doubt of defendant's fitness to enter a plea, the court has a duty to hold
a fitness hearing.
The Trial Court had before it the Petitioner's Notice of intent to offer a defense of
insanity or diminished capacity. The appointed examiners having examined the Petitioner
to determine his state of mind at the time of the crime stated they could not fully evaluate
the Petitioner owing to his amnesia. Both evaluators stated additional testing would be
required to determine the Petitioner's state of mind. They also indicated they had a
problem determining the exact type of emotional problem he had concluding with a
diagnoses of Borderline Personality. Both the Petitioner and his attorney requested an
additional evaluation. Moreover, the Petitioner's trial counsel had argued the Petitioner's
emotional and mental problems. This, in light of both Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966),
and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) both of which were subsequently clarified by our
Supreme Court in State v. Bailey 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) should have indicated to the
Trial Court that additional testing of the Petitioner was necessary and that a competency
hearing was required and the Trial Court was empowered pursuant to § 77-15-4 UTAH CODE
ANN. (1953) (as amended) to direct such additional evaluations for the purpose of
determining the Petitioner's competency.
If these indicia of incompetence did not, either individually or collectively, reach the
levels of the evidence in Pate or Drope, supra, they are enough to have created doubt as to
the Petitioner's ability to make a reasoned choice. They were, therefore, sufficient to require
an evidentiary hearing on that issue before the Petitioner's guilty plea was accepted. See
Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (1981).
The Petitioner's MPD was the cause of his diminished capacity during these stressful
10

periods of the Petitioner's life. Dr. Jeppsen provided the following insight into the mental
and emotional condition of the Petitioner during this time period:
In my opinion, Mr. York suffered from a multiple personality disorder
secondary to his longstanding abusive childhood and that he was confused by
memory lapses which resulted from his multiple personality disorder. I do not
think he was competent to stand trial. He did not have a clear memory of the
offense even though he pled guilty. Mr. York is unable to remember his
attorney telling him that he would go to prison if he pled guilty. In fact, he
was convinced that he was going to be sent somewhere for some treatment
instead.
Mr York was suffering from multiple personality disorder during the
crime and at the time of his trial when he pled guilty. He pled guilty to a
crime without a clear memory for it. His memory and reasoning ability at the
time of his trial impaired his ability to make a clear choice and to cooperate
with his attorney. Whether or not he is guilty of the crime of which he is
accused is not the issue and can only be decided by a trial. (Habeas Exhibit
No. 1)
What I do know is that multiple personality disorders, under stress,
disassociate. And Mr. York was under stress at the time. I would expect him
to be disassociating at the time. (Habeas P 71).
Dr. Carlisle states:
All we know is, in therapy, at one time they are talking as though Don
- well, they say that Don came back and went to the police station, but, in
another part, in talking to Dan, he is talking as though he is at the police
station. So I don't know who is at the police station. Or maybe even a third.
(Habeas P 60-61)
The Respondent relies on People v. Thomas, 616 N.E.2d 695 (111. App. 2 Dist.
1993) and Commonwealth v. Martin 616 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) and alleges
"amnesia, the only arguable manifestation of Petitioner's subsequently diagnosed MPD in
the trial court, did not render him incompetent." In both of these cases the key statement
is "amnesia by itself does not render an accused person incompetent. Also of note is that
in both cases the amnesia was involved with the use of alcohol, a very different cause of
11

amnesia than MPD.

Nevertheless, while "amnesia alone should not supply basis for

declaring defendant incompetent to stand trial "... amnesia is a factor to be considered in
determining whether defendant is able to meet test of competency to stand trial and to
obtain fair trial." State v. Owens, 807 P.2d 1292 (Kansas 1990) Emphasis added.
The Petitioner's problem was not amnesia for the crime. The Petitioner was suffering
from blackouts or transfer of personalities which resulted in the loss of information from one
personality to another. The Petitioner did not have an understanding of what was occurring
in relation to his defense and it was his trial counsel and not the Petitioner that told the
Trial Court what the Petitioner knew and understood. Compare this with what occurred in
People v. Thomas, supra:
Defendant was able to understand nature and purpose of proceedings
against him and to assist in defense and thus, was fit to enter a guilty plea; at
sentencing hearing defendant gave lucid speech on his own behalf in which he
recounted how his criminal behavior resulted from his addiction to alcohol....
The court admonished the defendant... and he represented to the court that
he understood nature of charges against him and that plea was voluntary. Id.
at 698.
In Commonwealth v. Martin 616 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993), "at the
defendant's request, the judge reads both reports discussed the contents with counsel, and
conducted a brief colloquy with the defendant.
The Petitioner maintains that had the additional testing and evaluation, requested by
his appointed evaluators occurred there is good reason to believe that the Petitioner's MPD
would have been discovered and the outcome would have been considerably different.
The Petitioner maintains that the Trial Court did not afford him due process by
accepting his plea when there was sufficient evidence to indicate the possibility that
Petitioner was not competent to enter a plea.
12

...[F]ailure to hold full hearing where there is a "substantial question of
possible doubt" of defendant's competence is error. (Citations omitted)....The
issue may require further inquiry, despite early findings of competence, if
subsequent events or testimony raise doubt. (Citations omitted). Id. at 816.
As is pointed out in Chavez, (Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (1981)) a judge
is responsible for more than sifting through arguments presented by Petitioners and
defendants. Chavez teaches that it is the trial court's responsibility, especially in criminal
cases, to protect a defendants due process rights. Of prime importance is to be alert to
information which indicates there might be a problem with the defendants ability and
competency to participate in their own trial and especially to waive their rights protected by
the Federal and State constitutions.
Here, in the face of the Petitioner's Notice of intent to offer a defense of insanity or
diminished capacity, the Trial Court never did avail itself of an any opportunity to have a
"face to face with any living witness", nor did it order any additional testing indicated in the
alienists reports to determine the Petitioner's state of mind and emotion at time of crime.
In fact the Trial Court rejected both the Petitioner's implied request and his trial counsel's
direct request for a 90 day evaluation and its attendant report.
Furthermore, the Trial Court, in its final comments at the Petitioner's sentencing
provides an insight into the its viewpoint concerning the rights of the Petitioner as well as
need for support from expert opinions as it states its feelings concerning the
mental/emotional state of the Petitioner.
THE COURT: ...I feel that as a result of the background of Mr. York,
he certainly was in a position where he did not have the training that maybe
some of the other of us had, but I feel that he was never in a circumstance
nor ever has been where he could not extricate himself from those
circumstances, in short of taking a life.
13

I will be frank, Mr. York, if it were possible for this Court to impose
the enhancement provision, I would have imposed those also. I figure and
feel that any consideration to your background in the terms of leniency as far
as you were concerned were imposed by the State of Utah in reducing this
from a capital felony down to one of a second degree homicide. ...your state
of mind is such that you are a danger to society. (Habeas Exhibit H)
Emphasis added.
From the Trial Courts own statements it is fair to assume that the Trial Court had
assumed its personal feelings were sufficient to determine the Petitioner's state of mind.
This is not acceptable. In fact the Trial Court makes an evaluation of the Petitioner's state
of mind that can not be supported by the evaluations of either of the appointed evaluators.
In addition the Trial Courts statements also indicate it was attempting to circumvent
the plea as far as possible and ignore any information that might be mitigating for Mr. York,
including his mental/emotional condition.
I will be frank, Mr. York, if it were possible for this Court to impose
the enhancement provision, I would have imposed those also. ...Though it may
well be that facilities are available that come over the years, put you in a
position where you can return to society and be a constructive member, but
I don't think that's going to happen for a considerable length of time and only
if you really want that.... But in the meantime, your state of mind is such that
you are a danger to society to be allowed to be anywhere but at the Utah
State Prison. (Habeas Exhibit H)
This evaluation was made on the strength of the Pre-Sentence Report (hereinafter
"PSR"). There never was a trial. The Trial Court goes far beyond the findings of the
appointed evaluators. In fact the Trial Court allowed to happen precisely what the Utah
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines
attempts to prevent: "No longer will presentence investigators4 and the Board of Pardons
attempt to compensate for plea bargaining." (Cited in La brum v. Board of Pardons et al, 227
4

. The Pre-Sentence Investigator and writer of the Petitioner's Pre-Sentence Report was the wife of one
of the prosecutors in this case, that is Melvin Wilson.
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Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (SC, 12/06/93)). In fact it did worse, it denied the Petitioner his
constitutional rights of due process and substituted instead the Trial Courts own feelings
toward the Petitioner's situation and his punishment. The Petitioner believes that this is not
right and seeks the opportunity to exercise those rights denied him by the Trial Court.
POINT II
THE WRIT COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE PETITIONER
COMPETENT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA.
The Writ Court attempted to avoided the issue of competency of Petitioner by stating
"After plea bargaining, petitioner changed his pleas to guilty to an amended information..."
(Writ Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)

The Writ Court joins the

Respondent and the Trial Court in confusing the question of what the alienists were asked
to determine. The Writ Court apparently believes that a person who the appointed
evaluators cannot determine their state of mind at the time of the crime does not need any
additional testing to discover that state of mind. Moreover, if those persons are unable to
obtain that additional testing then they should waive their constitutional right to a defense
and enter a plea to that offense.
The Respondent alleges that "the record fails to support Petitioner's claim that the
Dusky (Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (I960)) standard was misapplied
in this case" (Respondent's Brief P 26). They seem to believe that the Petitioner's
dysfunction, due to his MPD, together with his loss of continuity of thought, would not effect
his ability to know what was happening, make knowing and intelligent decisions, and
participate in his own defense.
This is contrary to the testimony provided by E. Allen Jeppsen, M.D., in the Habeas
Hearing and his attendant Evaluation of the Petitioner, (Habeas Exhibit No. 1), as well as
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supportive documentation from the DSM-III-R. Dr. Carlisle provides examples of the
Petitioner's personality switching and even comments that he doesn't know which of the
Petitioner's personalities was out at the police station immediately following the crime.
The Respondent cites Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), (hereinafter
"Lafferty //'), as supportive of the Writ Courts determination of the Petitioner's competence.
However, the Writ Court uses the Petitioner's statements made in the Plea hearing as the
supporting evidence that the Petitioner met the standards of competency. The statements
made and demeanor of the Petitioner in the court room at the time of his plea cannot be
used to support a finding of competency. Lafferty II states:
The state court's assessment of the trial demeanor evidence upon
revisiting the competency issue during and after trial is of doubtful validity
given the court's mistaken view of Dusky's rational understanding
requirements....The state court paid lip service to Dusky's requirement that
competence requires a rational understanding which is different from, and
more than, factual understanding.

Under the state court's view, then, a defendant suffering from paranoid
delusions is to be held competent to make decisions on how best to present
his mental state to a judge and jury even though that mental illness may strip
him of the ability to realistically determine where his best interests lie. Id. at
1555-56.
We conclude that the state trial judge applied the wrong legal standard
in finding Lafferty competent to stand trial. Although we do not hold that
Lafferty was incompetent as a matter of law, we do conclude that the record
contains evidence from which a fact finder could have found him incompetent
under the proper legal standard. Lafferty II at 1548
The findings of fact supporting the Writ Court's finding the Petitioner competent
reveal unambiguously that the Writ Court's evaluation of Petitioner was infected by a
misperception of the legal requirements set out in Dusky, apparently caused by the court's
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lack of knowledge of the underlying facts in that case. Indeed both the Writ Court and the
Trial Court appear to have embraced the view that factual understanding alone is sufficient,
a view as discussed above, that is totally contrary to the circumstances in not only this matter
but in Dusky itself, and a view that has been rejected by the those courts applying the Dusky
test. This court should not accept as consistent with Dusky and its progeny a finding of
competency made under the view that a defendant who is unable to accurately perceive
reality due to Multiple Personality Disorder need only act consistently with his disorder to
be considered competent to enter a plea. See Lafferty II.
In fact all the Writ Court does for its finding of fact is to list the history of the case
and cite three answers that the Petitioner made during the plea hearing. From those finding
of fact, excluding all other the testimony to the contrary, the Writ Court finds:
Although suffering from MPD at the time of the crimes and of his plea,
petitioner was able to understand the nature of the offenses, the nature and
purpose the possible punishment and the nature of the proceedings against
him. He was able to assist his attorney in his defense, and to make a rational
choice to plead guilty.
and thereon concludes:
Because he understood the nature of the proceedings, and the
punishment specified for the offenses and was able to assist counsel, petitioner
was competent to plead guilty on October 29, 1984. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239 (Utah 1988). (Hereinafter Lafferty /). [State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988), reversed on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th
Cir. 1991)]. Habeas Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 12.
It is shocking that the respondent should imply that the Petitioner has not given more
than ample evidence that both the Writ Court and the Trial Court ignored and denied the
Petitioner his due process.
The state trial court's finding of competency in this case is fatally
flawed by that court's assessment under a standard that is not only inconsistent
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with Dusky, but was specifically rejected by the legal test for competency
established in that case. In addition, when the evidence adduced on this issue
is viewed under the proper standard, the record indisputably does not provide
the fair support required to accord the finding a presumption of correctness.
Lafferty II at page 1551.
The Respondent alleges that the Petitioner must marshall all of the evidence. Again
the Respondent is in error. There is no evidence to marshall, there was no trial, there was
nothing except the records and testimony of witnesses which was presented to the Writ
Court; which the Writ Court chose to ignore, except for the finding of MPD.
It is ironic that the Respondent states that the Petitioner "merely reargues the
evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to this Court to 'sort out' what evidence actually
supports the habeas court's competency determination."

That is precisely what the

Respondent has done throughout its brief, in fact, the Respondent goes beyond rearguing,
it creates, distorts, mis-quotes, and then says "it was never addressed before the appeal so
it must be waived". Nevertheless, the Respondent then uses such "never addressed before
appeal" information in its own argument.
The Respondent states: "The only evidence supporting petitioner's assertion that his
MPD rendered him incompetent to plead guilty came from petitioner's witness, Dr.
Jeppsen..." Perhaps the Respondent believes that this Court is not alert or knowledgeable
enough to discern fact from fiction, or perhaps the Respondent can't understand all of the
testimony and evidence adduced in the Petitioner's Habeas Hearing or the documentation
provided in his Brief.
The Respondent continues with attempts to discredit the most experienced and
knowledgeable witness present, E. Alan Jeppsen, M.D.. Dr. Jeppsen is a well known and
highly respected Psychiatrist, in practice for over 20 years and having treated or seen more
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than 60 patients with MPD. {Habeas P 60 and 69). Dr. Jeppsen's evaluations of what would
be transpiring in the mind of the Petitioner are in complete accord with the description of
MPD as outlined in the DSM-III-R. (A complete transcript of the entire description of
MPD is provided as Appendix F in the Petitioner's brief).
The Respondant would have this Court accept without question the often
contradicting testimony of Alma Carlisle Ph.D., who was "trying to investigate MPD",
{Habeas Hearing P 48 L19), and was seeing 21 patients with MPD with the assistance of Ms.
Gilgen. {Habeas Hearing P 33-34). Dr. Carlisle's version of what he believes is occurring
in the Petitioner's mind is not in agreement with the DSM-III-R and he detours from the
accepted criteria and descriptions from the DSM-III-R with statements such as "I think it
is really far more complex than what is generally believed." {Habeas Hearing P 52)
The Respondent would have this Court believe "the record is devoid of indication that
petitioner was unable to accurately perceive reality" (Respondent's Brief P 29) and that
"during the plea colloquy petitioner claimed only that he could not specifically recall shooting
Longhurst"(P 30). The Respondent makes the same error the Writ Court does and relies
upon the plea colloquy to support their findings of competency. This is something which is
not acceptable as detailed by Lafferty II. The Respondent, after attempting to discredit Dr.
Jeppsen, quotes Dr. Carlisle's opinion that the Petitioner would be competent and capable
of functioning without any problem.
The Petitioner concedes that any of the Petitioner's separate personalities has or had
the possibility to think rationally within the framework of its memories. Dr. Carlisle said the
same:
Q.

Those rational decisions are based upon what their perceptions are,
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what it is they are ultimately looking for?
A.
I think to a degree. Based upon their perceptions of what they think
that they are charged with, and what could happen, because of those charges,
depending upon how they plead. (Habeas Hearing P 64 L 5-10).
However, how rational is an overall decision going to be if the Petitioner had two or
more personalities who were not sharing what they individually knew with the other
personality?

None of the personalities could have a full and clear picture of what is

occurring or what decisions should be made or what the consequences of those decisions are.
Even a lay person can understand the confusion that would be in a persons mind if they are
not receiving all the relevant information necessary for an informed decision. That is
precisely what the Petitioner stated was his state of mind concerning his plea. This is the
state of mind that Dr. Jeppsen was describing when he said:
Mr York was suffering from multiple personality disorder during the
crime and at the time of his trial when he pled guilty. He pled guilty to a
crime without a clear memory for it. His memory and reasoning ability at the
time of his trial impaired his ability to make a clear choice and to cooperate
with his attorney. (Habeas Exhibit No. 1)
Finally the Respondent tries to defend the Wit Courts rejection of any and all of the
conflicting evidence and testimony in its final attempt to eliminate Dr. Jeppsen as a witness.
This is done with an incomplete quote from Lafferty I at 1245, viz: "A finder of fact,
whether judge or jury, is free to reject diagnoses and conclusions that are not adequately
explained ... as unpersuasive and unhelpful." The full quote reads:
A finder of fact, whether judge or jury, is free to reject diagnoses and
conclusions that are not adequately explained. Even in the unlikely event that
a fact finder understands the full significance of a psychological term such as
"paranoid pseudo-community," the mere incantation of the term does not
convey much of substance because it fails to describe the analysis and data on
which the diagnosis was based, We do not mean to imply that doctors
diagnoses in this case were necessarily incorrect. We simply hold that in the
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absence of an adequate explanation, the trial court could properly reject as
unpersuasive and unhelpful the conclusory labels that doctors assigned to
Lafferty's condition. Lafferty I at 1245.
The Supreme Court's full quote then, allows a trial court to reject a diagnostic term if it isn't
accompanied with adequate explanation. Since the Writ Court has already accepted MPD
this can only be seen as a less than proper means to justify the Respondent's unjustifiable
point. Neither the Respondent nor the Writ Court can support their respective positions
if evidence and testimonies presented at the Habeas Hearing are fully examined.
Therefore, the Petitioner maintains that their was ample proof for the Writ Court to
have made the determination that the Trial Court erred in accepting the Petitioner's guilty
pleas. The Petitioner was not competent to have entered his pleas due to his affliction with
MPD at the time of the crime, at the police station following the crime, at all of the
subsequent hearings and court actions, during consultations with his attorney, and while
being tested and evaluated by his appointed examiners. The Petitioner also maintains that
the Trial Court should have ordered additional testing and held a competency hearing to
determine the nature and extent of the Petitioner's mental abnormalities before proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Never has the Petitioner denied a crime or crimes were committed nor has he denied
that he was present for at least part of the crime or crimes. Never has the Petitioner asked
to be excused for any criminal action he may have taken.
This is not a case where the State mounted a large and lengthy case against the
Petitioner and a jury of his peers found him guilty. This is not a case where the Petitioner
is requesting that he be relieved of all responsibility for a crime he may have committed and
to set him free because he was suffering from MPD. This is a case where, upon obtaining
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a diagnoses and the treatment, he had been asking for from the first, he discovered he had
been present at the crime scene but possibly had not committed the crimes. He finds
himself incarcerated, for almost ten (10) years, for crimes he may have not committed. His
natural feelings and desires are to have his constitutionally mandated due process rights and
to have this matter placed before a jury of his peers.
Based on the foregoing the Petitioner respectively requests that this Court reverse the
findings of the Court below and in so doing granting the Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus and remand this matter with directions for further proceedings consistent
therewith.
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